The performance of a collective system crucially depends on the way they interact as well as how they adapt to others. There are two closely related issues concerning a collective of interacting agents, the forward and inverse problems. The forward problem is to investigate what a collective of interacting agents determines as a complex emergent behavior. The inverse problem is to investigate how the private utility functions of agents can be modified so that their self-interested behavior collectively gives rise to a desired outcome. This paper examines the effects of the combined model of the partner choice and preference reinforcing in order to solve the inverse problem. Agents choose their partners and decide on a mode of behavior when interacting with selected partners. Two types of meta-agents are considered: conformists who behave based on the logic of majority, and nonconformists who behave based on the logic of minority. It is shown that a collection of conformists and nonconformists having the identical preference initially evolves into a collection of heterogeneous agents with diverse preferences and that they achieve both an efficient and equitable outcome.
Introduction
The following question is often addressed: how does a collection of interacting agents generate global macroscopic orders as a whole? An interesting aspect of interacting agents is emergent property. Natural evolution has created a multitude of systems in which the actions of interacting agents give rise to coordinated global information processing. Insect colonies, cellular assemblies, the retina, and the immune system have been often cited as examples of having emergent properties. Emergent property is surprising because it can be hard to anticipate the full consequences of even simple forms of interaction. Emergence also refers to the appearance of global information-processing capabilities that are not explicitly represented in the systems' elementary components or in their interconnection. However, there is no presumption that a population of interacting agents in an imperfect world leads to a collectively satisfactory result. How well agents do for it in adapting to their environment is not the same thing as how satisfactory is an environment they collectively create. While all agents understand the outcome is inefficient, acting independently is powerless to manage an efficient collective outcome.
In order to lead collective behavior to be a desirable one, we need to consider two different levels: the microscopic level, where the decisions of the individual agents occur and collective behavior can be observed. We also have to specify how agents interact, respond, adapt, or learn from each other. However, to understand the role of the link between these two levels also remains one challenge .
In examining collective effects, we shall draw heavily on the individual decisions. It might be argued that understanding how individuals make decisions is sufficient to understand collective behavior. Many researchers have pointed out that equilibrium theory does not resolve the question of how people behave in a particular interdependent decision situation. It is often argued, ''it is hard to see what can advance the discussion short of assembling a collection of people, putting them in the situation of interest, and observing what they do'' Goyal, 1998, 2000; Banerjee, 1999) . People have preferences, pursuing goals, and they behave in a way that we might call ''purposive''. We metaphorically ascribe motives to behavior because something behaves as if it were oriented toward a goal. But the purposes or objectives often relate directly to those of others. Therefore their behaviors are also constrained by other people who are pursuing their own purposes. Schelling (1978) characterized contingent behavior -behavior that depends on what others are doing. What makes contingent behavior interesting and difficult is that the entire aggregate outcome is what has to be evaluated, not merely how each person does within the constraints of her own environment. Although individual decision is important to understand, it is not sufficient to describe how a collection of agents arrives at specific decisions. We attempt to probe deeper understanding of the issue by specifying how they interact with each other. The greatest promise lies in analysis of situations where many agents behave in ways contingent on one another, and these situations are central in theoretical analysis of linking micro to macro levels of collective decision. The overall collective performance depends crucially on the type of interaction as well as on the heterogeneity of agent preferences. An externality occurs if one cares about others' decisions, and their decisions also affect her own decision. An agent's outcome, whichever way he makes his choice, also depends on the number of agents who choose one way or the other. An interesting problem is then under what circumstances will a collection of agents realize some particular stable situations, and whether they satisfy the conditions of efficiency Namatame, 2001, 2002) .
There are two closely related issues concerning a collective of interacting agents, the forward and inverse problems (Tumer and Wolpert, 2004 ). An agent behaves based not only on her preference but also on others' actions. It is also important to consider with whom an agent interacts and how each agent decides her action depending on others' actions. Agents are selfish in the sense that they only do what they want to do and what they think according to their own best interests, their motivations. They necessarily have different sets of goals, motivations, cognitive states by virtue of their different histories, the different resources they use, or different settings they participate in, and so on.
The inverse problem
Agents myopically adapt their behavior based on their idiosyncratic rule to others' behaviors. In the simplest form of our model, agents are born with fixed preferences. They are also assumed to be rational in the sense that they select their strategy in order to maximize their endogenous preferences as shown in Figure 1 (a). However individuals' behavior should be understood in a social setting. In order to understand their behavior, we must observe them within social and cultural environments. The inverse problem consists then to investigate how their endogenous preferences can be modified through interactions and strategy choices in the past as shown in Figure 1 It will be nice to motivate the source of learning algorithms by properly redesigning the payment schemes. One possible approach is to consider a mediator who provides the agents with algorithms to use and suggests payments to be made. This correlation device is not a designer who can enforce behaviors or payments, and it does not possess any private knowledge or aim to optimize private payoffs. Game theory is typically concerned with learning of a strategy (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998) . Agents repeatedly play a game, each time observing their rewards, which reflect their prefixed preference. Typically, these studies have the goal of showing that some simple update rule leads the agents to eventually adopt some Nash equilibrium. However, the learning algorithms themselves are not required to satisfy any rationality requirement; it is what they converge to, if adopted by all agents that should be in equilibrium. Shoham and Powers (2003) characterized the so-called 'AI agenda' asking what the best learning strategy is for a given agent for a fixed class of the other agents in the game [19] QA :4 . It thus retains the design stance of AI, asking how to design an optimal agent for a given environment. There is another agenda that is more prescriptive. It asks how agents should learn in the context of other learners. The recent literature on multi-agent learning also deals extensively with connections between distributed systems and the design of economic mechanisms. One central issue in that literature is the selection of a solution criterion: what can we assume about the agents' rational behavior. Much of the literature deals with the search for mechanisms where the agents will have dominant strategies that lead to desired behavior (maximizing social efficiency). However, it can be shown that such mechanisms rarely exist. One alternative is to consider mechanisms where there exists an ex post equilibrium: a strategy profile of the agents in which it is irrational to deviate from each agent's learning algorithm, assuming the other agents stick to their strategies, and regardless of the state of the system [20] QA :5 .
Classification of social interactions
Social interactions pose many coordination problems to individuals. There are many situations where interacting agents can benefit from coordinating their action. Examples where coordination is important include trade alliance, the choice of compatible technologies or conventions such as the choice of a software or language. We can classify interaction with externality into two types. Coordination usually implies that the increased effort by some agents leads the remaining agents to follow them, which rises a multiplier effect or bandwagon effects. These are also characterized as situations where interacting agents can benefit if they take the same action. We call this type as social interaction with positive externalities. In this case, agents behave based on the logic of majority, since agents receive payoffs if they select the same strategy as the majority does. These symmetric social interactions are modeled as coordination games in which an agent receives a payoff if he selects the same strategy as the others.
On the other hand, in the route selection problem for instance, an agents receives a payoff if he selects the opposite strategy as the majority does. For example, in the context of traffic networks, agents have to determine their routes independently. In telecommunication networks, they have to decide what fraction of their traffic to send on each link of the network. This type of interaction is distinguished by defining as social interaction negative externalities. In this case, agents behave based on the logic of minority, since agents receive payoff if they select the opposite strategy as the majority does (Beckmann et al., 1956) .
The El Farol bar problem and its variants minority games provide a clean and simple example of this type of social interaction (Challet and Zhang, 1997) . The market entry game is also a stylized representation of a common problem based on the logic of minority: a number of agents have to choose independently whether or not to undertake some activity, such as enter a market, go to a bar, or drive on a road, the utility from which decreasing in the number of the participants (Ochs, 1998; Duffy and Hopkins, 2002) . The choice of market entry games for studying coordination is quite natural. When there are too many potential entrants wishing to exploit a new market opportunity, a problem arises regarding how entry may be coordinated. Without coordination, too many firms may decide to enter the market and consequently they sustain losses. Conversely, fully aware of the consequences of excessive entry, firms may be reluctant to enter and exploit the market in the first place. These examples of social interaction typically admit a large number of Nash equilibria. Given this multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes, an obvious question is which type of equilibrium are agents likely to coordinate upon? The coordination failure is attributed to certain features of the payoff functions.
Rational decisions of conformists and nonconformists
In most cases, the decision can be thought of as having a positive and negative side -deciding to do a thing or not to do it. We model the problems of individual and collective decisions as follows: each agent has two alternatives, and the costs and benefits of each alternative depend on how many other agents choose the same alternative.
As a specific example, we consider the situation in which each agent in the population of N agents faces the binary decision problem with the following two choices:
One's decision to vote for a particular alternative may depend heavily on how many others decide to do so, partly because of social influence, partly because one does not want to waste her own vote.
In this example, the payoff matrix is given in Table 1 . When a i >0, agent i personally prefers to vote for, and if a i o0, she prefers to vote against. The Agents myopically change their actions based on their own rules obtained as a function of their idiosyncratic utility and of the actions of their neighbors. Assignment of heterogeneous agents also becomes important. We investigate the relation between the collective behavior and the assignment of heterogeneous agents.
(1) Rational decision of a conformist
We obtain a rational decision rule of a conformist. Let suppose the ratio of agents to choose S 1 is p(t). We define the threshold of conformist i as:
Then the rational decision rule of a conformist is given as:
(2) Rational decision of a nonconformist Nonconformist with the payoff matrix of Table 2 prefers the opposite choice of the majority. The threshold of a nonconformist i is defined as:
Then a rational decision rule of a nonconformist is given as:
The strategic decisions of a conformist and a nonconformist can be also modeled with the payoff matrix in Table 3 . If b i >0, agent i is a conformist, and if b i o0, she is a nonconformist. From the rational decision rules in (3.2) and (3.4), the agents with heterogeneous payoffs are classified into the following four types. The others
(1) Type 1: hardcore S 1 If agent i is a conformist with the payoff parameters 0 b i a i or she is a nonconformist with Àa i b i 0, she always chooses S 1 without regard to the others' decisions. In these cases, the strategy S 1 becomes a dominant strategy. This type of an agent is a hardcore of the S 1 chooser. (2) Type 2: hardcore S 2 If agent i's payoff parameters satisfy 0ob i o À a i when she is a conformist, or a i ob i o0 when she is a nonconformist, she always chooses S 2 without regard to the others' decisions. In this case, the strategy S 2 becomes a dominant strategy. This type of an agent is regarded as a hardcore of the S 2 chooser. (3) Type 3: conformist If agent i is conformist (b i >0) and her payoff parameters satisfies ja i job i , her rational decision depends on the proportion of agents who make the same decision. Since he prefers what the majority does, this type of an agent is regarded as a conformist. (4) Type 4: nonconformist If agent i is nonconformist (b i o0) and her payoff parameters satisfies ja i jo À b i , her rational decision depends on the proportion of agents who make the opposite decision. Since she prefers what the majority does not, this type of an agent is regarded as a nonconformist.
In Figure 2 , the x-axis represents the parameter value of a i , each agent's preference level over two choices (purposive behavior), and the y-axis represents the parameter value of b i , the level of consistency with the others' decisions The others Table 3 . The payoff matrix of a conformist (b i >0) and nonconformit (b i o0)
The other agents
Selective Interaction with Reinforcing Preference(contingent behavior). An infinite number of possible decision rules of heterogeneous agents can be classified into the above four types.
Heterogeneity in preferences
In human societies, an essential element is that individuals differ from each other. The diversity comes into play in many instances of collective behavior. In this section, we depart from the assumption of homogeneity with respect to the payoff parameters. In particular, we consider continuum games with infinite number of heterogeneous agents with respect to their preferences. We assume that a conformist has the payoff matrix in Table 4 , and a nonconformist in Table 5 . We should remark that the payoff matrices in Tables 1  and 2 are strategically equivalent with those in Tables 4 and 5 . The heterogeneity among agents can be described by their payoff parameter y ensuring an enormous simplification in the present analysis. In our model, agents have idiosyncratic payoff parametery. The diversity of a collection of heterogeneous agents is characterized by the distribution function of the payoff parameter y. We consider a collection of N agents, and denote the number of agents with the same parameter value y by n(y). We define the density of y by f(y), which is obtained by dividing n(y) by the total number of agent N, i.e. f ðyÞ ¼ nðyÞ=N ð5Þ
As specific examples, we consider three density functions in Figure 3 . In Figure 3(case 1) , all agents have the same payoff parameter value y ¼ 0.5, and in Figure 3 (case 2), a half of the population have the payoff parameter value y ¼ 0, and the rest of them have y ¼ 1. In examining collective effects, we shall draw heavily on the individual adaptive decisions. Within the scope of our model, we treat the case in which agents make deliberate decisions by applying rational procedures, which also guide their reasoning. In order to describe the adaptation process at the individual level, we may have two fundamental models, global interaction and local interaction. It is important to consider with whom an agent interacts and how she decides her action depending on others' actions. Agents may adapt based on the aggregate information representing the current status of the whole system (global information). In this case, each agent chooses an optimal decision based on aggregate information about how all other agents behaved in the past. In many situations, agents are not assumed to be able to correctly guess or anticipate other agents' actions, or they are not able to know how to calculate best replies. With local adaptation, each agent is modeled to adapt to local information Tennenholtz, 2002) .
As a specific model, we consider the lattice structure as shown in Figure 4 . We arrange a collection of heterogeneous agents in the torus of 50 Â 50 (2500) agents where the four corners and an edge of an area connect it with an opposite side. The consequence of their actions also gives an effect on agents with whom they are not directly linked. The hypothesis of local adaptation also reflects limited ability of agents to receive, decide, and act based upon information they receive in the course of interaction. Choice of agent i Choice of other agents
Global adaptation rule of a conformist Agents adopt actions that optimize their expected payoff given what they expect the others to do. In this model, agents choose the best replies to the empirical frequencies distribution of the previous actions of the others. The main point is that an agent's decision depends on what he knows about the others. We obtain the adaptive rule of each agent as her best response. We denote the proportion of agents having chosen S 1 at time t by p(t). The optimal adaptive rule of an agent is obtained as the function of the aggregate information on collective p(t) and her idiosyncratic payoff parameter y as follows: 
Local adaptation rule of a conformist
We denote the proportion of the neighbors of an agent having chosen S 1 at time t by p i (t). The optimal adaptive rule with local adaptation is obtained as follows:
We evaluate the collective result of interacting heterogeneous agents with two criteria, efficiency and equity. Efficiency is evaluated by the average utility, which also stands for the measure of the desirability at the macro level. Equity is evaluated the utility distribution, which stands for the measure of the desirability at the micro level. The Gini ratio is often used to measure the dispersion of the utility distribution of a society. The pairs of the average payoff U and equity E of all heterogeneous populations of conformists both under global adaptation and local adaptation are shown in Figure 5 . The effect of local adaptation compared with global adaptation has been discussed by many researchers Tennenholtz, 2002) . With these simulation results, both efficiency and equity are low when heterogeneous agents adapt locally. The merit of local adaptation is enhanced for the collective of conformists.
Global adaptation rule of a nonconformist
The global adaptive rules of a nonconformist is obtained as follows: Local adaptation rule of a nonconformist The local adaptive rule of a nonconformist is obtained as follows:
We evaluate a collective of nonconformists with two criteria, efficiency and equity. The pairs of the average payoff U and equity E of all heterogeneous populations of nonconformists both under global adaptation and local adaptation are shown in Figure 6 . As shown in Figure 6 , both efficiency and equity are low when conformists adapt locally. On the other hand, the merit of local adaptation is enhanced for the collective of nonconformists.
Selective interaction of heterogeneous agents
We formalize our idea by modeling a population of heterogeneous agents in which agents are repeatedly matched within a long-time period to play coordination games, see Table 4 . There are many parameters to be considered such as payoff matrix, population structure, population configuration, the number of agents, and so on. Among these parameters, we examine the effects of heterogeneity in payoffs y and the configuration of locating agents. The interaction methodology also plays an important role in the outcome. We consider two Assignment of heterogeneous agents also becomes important. We investigate the relation between the collective behavior and the assignment of heterogeneous agents. Our interest is to investigate whether that systems, in which many locally connected processors with no central control, can produce efficient collective performance. We evaluate the collective behavior from the criteria of both efficiency and equity.
The crucial concept for describing heterogeneity of agents is their preference characterized by the value of payoff parametery. Heterogeneity of preferences makes it possible to have a different type of interaction, selective interaction. This is possible because each agent has a different payoff parameter. We classify heterogeneous agents into the following two types:
Type 1: The payoff parameter value y is less than 0.5 (such an agent prefers S 1 to S 2 ). Type 2: The payoff parameter value y is greater than 0.5 (such an agent prefers S 2 to S 1 ).
We also classify interaction types into the following three types as shown in Figure 7: (1) Random assignment: each agent has a chance to interact with neighbors of any type. 
5). (a) Global adaptation and (b) Local adaptation
We describe the selective interaction process of the agents. An agent of type 1 (yr0.5) chooses S 1 , since such an agent prefers S 1 to S 2 . On the other hand, an agent of type 2 (y>0.5) chooses S 2 , since such an agent prefers S 2 to S 2 . In Figure 8 , we represent the selection process of an agent. Each agent interacts with neighbors by choosing her preferred strategy. If she receives the average payoff per one neighbor more than 0.5, she remains in the same location, otherwise she moves to another location and interacts with different neighbors.
At the beginning, we set two types and heterogeneous agents randomly in the lattice of 50 Â 50 agents. Conformists and nonconformists of type 1 and type 2 are randomly assigned as shown in Figures 9(a) and 10(a) . Each agent interacts with current 8 neighbors. If an agent receives an average payoff per one neighbor less than 0.5, then he is defined as ''unhappy agent''. We choose randomly any two unhappy agents on the lattice, and we replace their locations so that all unhappy agents can change their current neighbors. After a few hundreds of rounds, a collection of heterogeneous conformists could self-organize both their locations and their actions so that they can realize homogeneous interaction as shown in Figures 9(b) (conformists) and 10(b) (nonconformists).
We evaluate collectives of both conformists and nonconformists with two criteria, efficiency and equity. The pairs of the average payoff U and equity E under selective interaction are shown in Figure 11 . Compared with the results shown in Figure 5 , both efficiency and equity are improved when agents interact with the fixed neighbors. Therefore, a collective of heterogeneous agents can achieve the highest efficiency and equity under selective interaction.
Selective interaction with reinforcing preferences
Game theory is typically based upon the assumption of a rational choice (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998) . The real advantage of the rational-choice assumption is that it often allows deduction. The main alternative to the assumption of rational choice is the adaptive approach with reinforcement learning. With reinforcement learning, agents tend to adopt actions that yielded a high payoff, and to avoid actions that yielded a low payoff. Agents will try any of the Figure 7 . Assignment of heterogeneous agents (a) Random, (b) sorting, and (c) Mixed binary choices, and repeat the strategy that led to high payoffs in the past experiences. Propensity of trying a strategy is increased according to the associated payoff. Payoff describes choice behavior, but it is one's own past payoffs that matter, not the payoffs of the others. The basic premise is that the probability of taking an action in the present increases with the payoff that resulted from taking that action in the past. In this section, we consider a collection of homogeneous agents who initially have the same payoff parameter with y ¼ 0.5 in Table 4 , and the threshold density is shown in Case 1 in Table 6 . Similarly, agents who receive an average payoff more than 0.5 by choosing S 2 , they increase y by Dy ¼ 0.01. In Figure 12 , we represent the processes of collective reinforcement learning. (1) A collective of conformists We show the transition of the density function of a collective of conformists in Figure 13 . In Figure 13 (a), all conformists have the same value y ¼ 0.5 at the beginning, and the initial proportion of agents who choose S 1 is set to p(0) ¼ 0.25. A collection of identical conformists gradually self-reinforce their payoff value (preference), and after a repetition of T ¼ 600 rounds, all agents have the same value of y ¼ 1. In Figure 13 (c), the initial proportion p(0) is set to p(0) ¼ 0.5. Identical conformists with the same payoff parameter y ¼ 0.5 selfreinforce their payoff parameters, and after a repetition of T ¼ 600 rounds, all agents have the same parameter y ¼ 0. In Figure 13 (b), the initial proportion is set to p(0) ¼ 0.5, and after learning process of T ¼ 600 periods, a half of agents have the same payoff parameter y ¼ 0, and the rest of agents have y ¼ 1. In all three cases, a collection of identical agents at the beginning collectively reinforce their preferences and evolve into heterogeneous agents, so that the most efficient and equitable collective action can be self-organized. However, the result of collective learning heavily depends on the initial ratio of choosing either strategy.
(2) A collective of nonconformists
We show the transition of the density function of a collective of nonconformists in Figure 14 . Figure 14(a) gives the results when all conformists have the same value y ¼ 0.5 at the beginning, and the initial proportion of agents to choose S 1 is set to p(0) ¼ 0.5. A collection of identical conformists gradually self- the agents with y ¼ 1. Figure 14(b) shows the results when the initial proportion of agents to choose S 1 at beginning is set to either p(0) ¼ 0.25 or p(0) ¼ 0.75. They remain as homogeneous agents with the same payoff parameter y ¼ 0.5 and they fail to reinforce their preferences. The success of reinforcing nonconformists' preferences to induce desired collective behavior heavily depends on the initial condition.
(3) A mixed collective of conformists and nonconformists We have observed that the success of collective reinforcement learning of conformists and nonconformists heavily depends on the initial condition to choose either strategy. We now consider a mixed case in which conformists who behave with the majority rule and nonconformists who behave with the minority rule coexist in the same population. We assume that the ratios of conformists and nonconformists are the same. Figure 15 shows the results when the initial proportion of agents to choose S 1 is set to p(0) ¼ 0.25. A collection of identical agents who have the same payoff parameter y ¼ 0.5 initially, gradually self-reinforce their preferences, and after the repetition of T ¼ 1000 periods, 75% of the agents reinforced the payoff parameter up to y ¼ 1, and the rest of 25% of agents reinforced to y ¼ 0. The ratio of agents who choose S 1 is 75%, and all conformists (50% of the total population) choose S 1 and 50% of nonconformists (25% of the total population) choose S 1 . The ratio of agents who choose S 2 is 25%, and they are all nonconformists. Figure 16 shows the results when the initial proportion of agents to choose S and 50% of nonconformists (25% of the total population) choose S 2 . The ratio of agents to choose S 1 is 25%, and they are all nonconformists. Figure 17 shows the results when the initial proportion is set as p(0) ¼ 0.5. In this case, a half of agents reinforce to have y ¼ 1, and the rest of agents have y ¼ 0. The ratio of agents who choose S 1 is 50%, and a half of conformists (25% of the total population) choose S 1 and 50% of nonconformists (25% of the total population) also chose S 1 . The same thing is true for agents who chose S 2 . In all three cases, a collection of identical agents collectively reinforce their preferences and evolve into heterogeneous agents, so that the most efficient and equitable collective action can be self-organized. The success of collective reinforcement learning therefore depends on the coexistence of conformists and nonconformists who behave with the opposite rules.
Conclusion
There is no presumption that a collective of interacting agents leads to a satisfactory performance. Agents normally react to others' decisions, and the resulting volatile collective action is often far from being efficient. In this paper, we investigated how the preferences of agents can be reinforced so that their selfinterested behavior collectively gives rise to a desired outcome. There are many parameters to be considered such as payoff matrix, population structure, population configuration, number of agents, and so on. Among these parameters, we examine the heterogeneity of payoffs and the configuration of locating heterogeneous agents. Agents myopically evolve their actions based on their own rules obtained as a function of their idiosyncratic utility and of the actions of their neighbors. Assignment of heterogeneous agents also becomes to be important. We examined the interaction between partner choice and individual preferences. Agents choose their partners and also decide on a mode of behavior in interactions with these partners. We also investigated how interacting homogeneous agents evolves into heterogeneous agents with diverse preferences by reinforcing their preferences so that they can realize the most efficient and equitable collective action. We showed that the most crucial factor that considerably improves the performance of the system of interacting agents are the endogenous selection of the partners and reinforcement of preferences at individual level. 
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